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ID the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
EMERALD OIL COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
STATE

TAX

Civil No.
7984

COMMISSION

OF

UTAH,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF,
EMERALD OIL COMPANY
Certiorari from the State Tax Commission of the
State of Utah

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is before the court to review the lawfulness
of defendant's decision which denied two claims, duly and
regularly filed by plaintiff, for refund because of plain-
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tiff's overpayment of taxes for the taxable years 1949
and 1950, imposed by Title 80, Chapter 13, Utah Code An-·
notated 1943, (now, and hereafter referred to as, Title 59,
Chapter 13, Utah Code Anotated 1953), one of which
claims is in the amount of $10,698.86, for plaintiff's overpayment of such taxes for the taxable year 1949. The other
claim is in the amount of $9,052.00 for plaintiff's overpayment of such taxes for the taxable year of 1950. The facts
in this case are not in dispute.
Plaintiff was incorporated under the laws of the State
of Utah on January 14, 1909, for the purpose of developing
oil and gas lands located in Rio Blanco County, State of
Colorado, which lands represented the capital with which
it commenced business (R. 34, Ex. A). The only property
either real or personal, owned by plaintiff since its incorporation, including the years 1949 and 1950, consisted of said
oil and gas lands, together with the equipment thereon and j
appurtenances thereto (R. 34; 35).
Following plaintiff's incorporation, plaintiff performed
the necessary work on said lands in Colorado and complied
with the laws and regulations of the United States to obtain, and it did obtain, patents covering said oil and gas
lands in Colorado as particularly described in Exhibit ''B"
attached to the stipulation of facts between plaintiff and
defendant, which is part of the record in this case (R. 34).
After its incorporation, plaintiff commenced operations on said oil lands. It hired employees and purchased
the necessary machinery and equipment to drill for oil and
develop said lands. It drilled wells, and constructed roads,
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reservoirs and a warehouse on said lands. Plaintiff's operations in Colorado resulted in the discovery and production
of oil and the sale thereof (R. 46; 47; 70).
On May 2, 1940 and May 23, 1942, respectively, plaintiff entered into two agreements with Equity Oil Company
under the terms of which the latter company was granted
the exclusive right of possession of said lands for the purpose of developing, drilling, producing, storing and marketing oil therefrom, subject to plaintiff's right to enter on
said lands for the purpose of inspecting the same ·and the
operations thereon. Plaintiff reserved the surface rights
to said lands. Said agreements obligated Equity Oil Company and its assigns to pay royalties for oil and gas produced and marketed from said lands and, among other
things, required certain drilling operations thereon (R. Exhibits C and D; R. 79).
Subsequent to said agreements of May 2, 1940 and May
23, 1942, and including the years 1949 and 1950, the entire
income of plaintiff (except a small sum representing interest on government bonds) was derived from royalties paid
to plaintiff under the terms of said agreements (R. 35).
In order to show the continuity of the operations of
plaintiff in Colorado, plaintiff made the following proffer
of proof covering the activities of plaintiff during the
period between the time of entering into said agreements
and the years 1949 and 1950 (R. 49-51; 60) :
"We make the proffer that this evidence would
show that prior to the years 1949 and 1950, the officers of the Company made regular trips to the
Rangely oil fields in the State of Colorado for the
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purpose of inspecting its property, for the purpose
of looking into the drilling program that was agreed
to be conducted under its agreements with various
oil companies to which it had leased the property,
and including the Raven Oil Company mentioned by
Mr. Vernon, and also the Equity Oil Company which
is referred to in the agreements in question; that it
was necessary for the company through its officers
to employ during, a period of this time which is
excluded, a representative in Colorado who performed activities for the Company in protecting its interest to see that the drilling program was carried
out in accordance with the agreements referred to,
that the oil was properly measured, and other matters which might come up; that the Company during
this period of time through its officers and directors,
and as instructed by its stockholders in their annual
meetings, had occasion to go to Colorado on matters
which arose as to rights-of-way over the property,
as to matters of trespass on the property by persons,
and as to matters of leasing the property for grazing
purposes ; that disputes arose in its early history as
to certain of its unpatented mining claims and that
it had to conduct litigation in the State of Colorado
with respect to these claims; that it was necessary
for the officers on occasion to meet with the officials
in the County Treasurer's and the County Assessor's
offices in Colorado to adjust the matter of taxes involved; that it was necessary during the period of
time which the Commission has excluded that the
officers make investigations of its oil properties in
Colorado to determine the number of wells that had
been brought into production and the measurement
devices used by the oil companies in measuring the
Company's share of the oil."

1

The evidence shows that during the years 1949 and
1950, the officers arid directors of the company made
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frequent trips to the company's lands in Colorado (R. 48;
55). Mr. Andrew J. Vernon, who had been an officer and
director of the company for many years, testified with respect to the nature and purposes of these trips, as follows:
That they were made: "Well, to inspect the
field generally." He said, "Well, we inspected the
field as for the location of the wells and to get them
on a map. We had a large map; we wanted to get
the location of these wells on our map to show where
the drilling was being done. That was one of the
things. And another thing, to determine if the companies were drilling their quota of wells in the field ;
to determine the producing wells and if there was
any dry holes ; to determine how many wells were
producing without being pumped, also to learn how
many wells were being pumped; to determine if
there was any wells producing water or gas excessively; to determine if there was any wells shut
in and for what purpose, for what reason. We also
went to the superintendent of the field (superintendent of the operating company in the field) to find
out the depth of these wells that were being drilled.
* * * We also went to his office (said superintendent's) to find the log of the well, what the strata
was and what they were going down through, and how
much sand bearing oil there was in these deep wells.
We also inspected the tanks, the method of measuring or gauging or metering the oil, both the shallow
and the deep oil. We also got the number of barrels
that were being freighted out from the field and
compared them with the refinery that· were receiving the oil. * * * We inspected the route of the
telephone line out there to see if it would interfere
with the drilling in any way; also the power line,
the pipe line that went across our ground. We also
looked after our warehouse and material that we

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

had on the ground. * * * Also to see that the
livestock wasn't trespassing on our ground to interfere with the drilling or the operation of the oil
companies" (R. 51-53).
It was testified that the company employed a representative, or agent, in Colorado, to whom it paid a salary
for looking after the company's interests. Mr. H. Walter
Woolley, who had been the secretary and treasurer and
director of the company for many years, testified that said
inspection trips to Colorado were participated in by every
member of the Board of Directors (R: 57; 61).
Mr. Woolley also testified :
"If we wanted any information as to the physical well being of the field, we had to go get it. In
other words, there was no other way of knowing
how the field physically was being handled and operated and what the problems were without going to
get it there" (R. 63).

It appears from the testimony of Mr. Woolley that
there were various other matters which required the attention of the officers of the corporation in Colorado such as
rights of way for a pipe, telephone and electric lines, the
investigation of possible adverse claims against said oil
lands and tax matters (R. 65-67).
With respect to Utah, the company held its stock·
holders' and directors' meetings at Vernal, Utah. It maintained no office in Utah. Its corporate books were kept by
its secretary and treasurer whose regular employment was
with the Uintah State Bank (R. 55-57; 62; 63). Also, its
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bank account was at Vernal, Utah, through which account
it made payment of dividends (R. 73).
After the payment of taxes and other expenses, dividends were declared and paid to its stockholders out of the
royalties received from said oil lands as authorized by the
Board of Directors. Such activities represented substantially all of the functions of the company in the State of Utah
(R.62;81).
Mr. McDonald, the attorney for defendant, produced testimony from Mr. Woolley to the effect that the two agreements between the company and Equity Oil Company were
authorized by the Board of Directors at a meeting held at
Vernal, Utah (R. 77-79). The testimony discloses that the
preliminary investigations and negotiations which resulted
in the execution of said agreements were carried on in the
State of Colorado (R. 81).
The record also shows that the company paid its franchise tax for authority to do business as a foreign corporation in Colorado, ad valorem taxes on its real property in
said state and substantial taxes based and measured on the
company's share in the production of oil from said lands.
It appears that the latter taxes were levied and assessed
by the State of Colorado on the basis of net income derived
from property located and business transacted within said
state. The company paid to the State of Colorado on February 23, 1951, and December 23, 1951, taxes in the sum of
$52,440.59 for the years 1945 to 1951 inclusive; and also
paid to Rio Blanco County, State of Colorado taxes in the
amount of $23,669.97 (R. 35; 79-81).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT'S DECISION DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR REFUND IS CONTRARY TO SECTION 59-13-20 (1) UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, BECAUSE IT ALLOCATES
TO UTAH, INCOME DERIVED FROM BUSINESS DONE OUTSIDE THIS STATE.
(a) The taxes for which plaintiff claims a refund were computed and paid by plaintiff on income which was all derived from business done by
plaintiff in the State of Colorado.
(b) The case of J. M. and M. S. Browning Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 P.
2d 993, upon which defendant relies in allocating
said income to Utah and denying plaintiff's claims,
is distinguishable because plaintiff was not carrying on an "investment business."

POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR REFUND BECAUSE OF
ITS OVERPAYMENT OF TAXES DURING
THE TAXABLE YEARS 1949 AND 1950, IS
CONTRARY TO TITLE 5.9, CHAPTER 13,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS IN
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UTAH DURING SAID TAXABLE YEARS
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SAID STATUTE.
(a) The proper basis and measure of plaintiff's
tax liability was net income, if any, derived
from business done in Utah.
(b) The corporate acts of plaintiff in Utah,
during the taxable years 1949 and 1950, did not
constitute "doing business" witl~in the meaning of
that term as used by the Utah act.
ARGUMENTPOINT I.
THE DEFENDANT'S DECISION DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR REFUND IS CONTRARY TO SECTION 59-13-20 (1) UTAH'CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, BECAUSE IT ALLOCATES
TO UTAH, INCOME DERIVED FROM BUSINESS DONE OUTSIDE THIS STATE.
Section 59-13-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which
sets forth rules for determining net income to be allocated
to Utah, provides: "(1) Rents, interest and dividends derived from business done outside this state less related expenses shall not be allocated to this state."
(a) The taxes for which plaintiff claims a refund were computed and paid by plaintiff on income which was all derived from business done by
plaintiff in the State of Colorado.
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The authorities hereinbelow cited under POINT NO. 2
hold that the corporate acts of the defendant in Utah did
not constitute "doing business" within the purview of statutes imposing a franchise tax. Irrespective of whether
plaintiff was doing business in Utah within the meaning
of that term as used in the Utah act, the record in this
I
case discloses that the entire income yielded from plaintiff's oil lands located in Colorado, was solely and directly
attributable to plaintiff's activities in Colorado. Whatever
gainful pursuit was carried on by plaintiff since, and pursuant to the purpose of, its incorporation, was carried on in
Colorado. The Utah act and the decisions of this state construing the same, clearly indicate that the basis and
measure of said tax is the business done by the taxpaying
corporation which is productive of income. J. M. and M.S.
Browning Co. v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154
P. 2d 993; California Packing Corporation v. State Tax
Commission, 97 Utah 367, 93 P. 2d 463.
I

The term "doing business" has been variously defined
by the courts. As Justice Wolfe points out in the Brou·niug
case:
"The definitions differ widely depending upon
the context in connection with which the term is
found * * * Little can be gained from a detailed study of the cases discussing the term 'doing
business' with a different context."

It is clear, however, from the record in this case, that
plaintiff was engaged in business in the State of Colorado
in the sense which that term is used in the Utah statute.
Royalties are in some respects different from rents as the.
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term rent is ordinarily understood. Royalties represent a
· landowner's share of oil, gas or other minerals which are
: produced and sold from his land. The royalties which plain~ tiff's Colorado properties yielded in the years 1949 and
: 1950 are not attributable to any specific activities of plaintiff within any designated period of time. The royalties
~which plaintiff received during said years were the fruit
: of the continuity of plaintiff's activities in Colorado.

Colorado not only imposed a franchise tax against
plaintiff for the privilege of its doing business in that state
and an ad valorem tax against plaintiff's oil lands, but
. Colorado also levied a substantial tax against plaintiff based
on and measured by the net income derived from plaintiff's
. property located and business transacted within Colorado
during the taxable years in question. If plaintiff is held
to be liable also for taxes as found and determined under
the decision of defendant, which is before this court for
:review, plaintiff then will have been subjected to double
taxation which the legislature clearly has indicated should
be avoided.
(b) The case of J. M. and M. S. Browning Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 P.
2d 993, upon which defendant relies in allocating
said income to Utah and denying plaintiff's claims,
is distinguishable because plaintiff was not carrying on an "investment business."
The Browning case held that the income of the taxipaying corporation was derived from carrying on an "investment business" solely in Utah and that it was such business
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done by the taxpaying corporation which was the basis and
measure of the tax. The Browning case places the emphasis
on business done by the taxpaying corporation rather than
upon business done by companies in which the taxpaying
corporation holds investments. To this extent, the Browning case overrules American Investment Corporation v. ,
I
State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 189, 120 P. 2d 331. It is
clear that plaintiff was never engaged in an "investment
business" within the sense of the Browning case. Justice ·
Wolfe, speaking for the court in the Browning case, says:
1

"J. M. & M.S. Browning Company, among other
things not material to the issues of this case, en. gaged in the business of investing and reinvesting
its funds in domestic and foreign stocks and bonds
and holding the same for investment."
"The 'business done' in carrying on an investment business is to invest money in stocks, bonds,
properties, first mortgages, and to make loans, etc.,
and to collect the fruits of such investments by collecting rents, interest and dividends."
In American Investment Corporation v. State Tax Commission (supra), which was overruled by the Browning
case, Justice Wolfe, in his dissenting opinion, states:
"The statute we here construe concerns, I repeat, the franchise of an 'investment' company. Its
business consists of transactions in the making of
investments in other corporations and enterprises.
Its profits or losses result from doing such business." '
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POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR REFUND BECAUSE OF
ITS OVERPAYMENT OF TAXES DURING
THE TAXABLE YEARS 1949 AND 1950, IS
CONTRARY TO TITLE 59, CHAPTER 13,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS IN
UTAH DURING SAID TAXABLE YEARS
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SAID STATUTE.
If, contrary to the findings of the defendant, plaintiff
was not doing business within the State of Utah during the
taxable years in question, within the sense of said statute,
the net income -yielded from royalties on plaintiff's Colorado
oil lands was not the proper basis and measure of the tax
imposed by the Utah Franchise Tax Act.

(a) The proper basis and measure of plaintiff's
tax liability was net income, if any,. derived
from business done in Utah.
The basis and measure of the tax imposed by the Utah
statute is income derived from business done by the taxpaying corporation within the State of Utah, or the fair
value of its tangible property in this state, whichever results in the greater tax; "but in no case shall the tax be
less than $10.00." Section 59-13-3, Utah Code Annotated
1953. Plaintiff never owned any tangible property in the
State of Utah. The basis and measure of plaintiff's tax
liability, therefore, was its net income assignable to busi-
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ness done within the State of Utah, with a minimum tax
liability of $10.00.
That the tax imposed against corporations by the Utah
act, with the exceptions above noted, is based upon and
measured by income derived from engaging in or carrying
on business within Utah, has been clearly stated by the
legislature and this court. The first paragraph of Section
59-13-20 of Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides:
I
"The portion of net income assignable to business done within this state, and which shall be the
basis and measure of the tax imposed by this chapter, may be determined by an allocation upon the
basis of the following rules:" (Emphasis ours).
The Browning case affirms this interpretation of the
statute as follows :
"The tax is not an income tax. * * * The
tax is imposed on the privilege of exercising the
corporate franchise or on the privilege of doing
business in Utah."
"By using the net income of the taxpayer, allocated to Utah as the measure of the amount of the
tax imposed upon the privilege of doing business in
Utah, the statute ties the amount of the ta.r to the
income yielded from exercising the privilege of doiug
business or exercising the corporate franchise"
(Emphasis ours).

In California Packing Corporation v. State TaJ.· Com·
mission, (supra) this court said:
"The tax established in the act is 'in the nature
of an excise tax levied against domestic and foreign
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corporations alike for the privilege of doing business
in a corporate capacity within this state.' Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 94 Conn. 47,
1008 A. 154, 157; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State
Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, 69 L.
Ed. 282 ; Stanley Works v. Hackett, 122 Conn. 54 7,
190 A. 743. The language of the statute throughout
evidences an intent only to determine the franchise
tax from income from business done under the
franchise from the state, that is business done within the state. The various methods of allocation are
designed to restrict the tax to business done within
the state and to assign to the state for taxation that
portion of the business reasonably attributable to the
state. There is also apparent -a purpose to avoid
double taxation. The statute itself provides:

"'* * * (1) Rents, interest and dividends
derived from business done outside this state less related expenses shall not be allocated to this state.
* * *'
"' (3) Rents, interest and dividends derived
from business done in this state less related expenses
shall be allocated to this state'."
The initial question, therefore, with respect to plaintiff's tax liability, except as to the minimuin tax of $10.00,
is whether, during the taxable years 1949 and 1950, plaintiff was doing business within the State of Utah within the
purview of the statute. The net income to be allocated to
this state in accordance with the rules set forth in Section
59-13~20 of said code, is income attributable to business
done within this state; and rule (8) of said section authorizes the Tax Commission to make such allocation so as to
avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation.
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(b) The corporate acts of plaintiff in Utah,
during the taxable years 1949 and 1950, did not
constitute "doing business" within the meaning of
that term as used by the Utah act.
The corporate action of plaintiff in Utah during the
years 1949 and 1950 was confined to the management of its
internal affairs. Plaintiff hired no employees, rented no
office and maintained no organization in Utah to carry on
business for profit and gain. Numerous authorities hold
that under the circumstances disclosed by the record in
this case, a corporation is not doing business within the
purview of statutes such as the Utah act. 51 Am. Jur. P.
714, Sec. 796; 124 A. L. R. 1110.
Such meaning of the term "doing business" as used
in acts imposing a franchise tax has been recognized by
this court. J. M. and M.S. Browning Company v. State T~
Commission (supra) ; American Inv. Corporation v. State
Tax Commission (supra) ; California Packing Corporation
v. State Tax Commission (supra). And such interpretation
of the term "doing business" has been applied in the follow·
ing cases, some of which are cited and relied upon in said
Utah decisions. Cottonwood Coal Company v. Junod, 7~
Mont. 3.92, 236 P. 1080; Norman v. Southwestern R. Com.
pany, 42 Ga. App. 812, 157 S. E. 531; United States v
Emery Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 35 S. Ct. 499
59 L. Ed. 825; People ex rel. Manila Electric R. and Light·
ing Corporation v. Knapp, 229 N. Y. 502, 128 N. E. 892
894; State v. Anniston Rolling Mills, 125 Ala. 121, 27 So
921; People v. Pestner, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1017; McCoach V
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Mine Hill Railway Company, 228 U. S. 295; Flint

v.

Tracy

Company, 220 U. S. 107.

In Cottonwood Coal Company v. Junod, (supra) the
taxpaying corporation was organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Minnesota with its principal place
of business in the City of St. Paul, for the general business
of mining coal or other minerals and doing whatever was
necessary or proper in connection therewith, and was duly
qualified to do business in the State of Montana. The Minnesota corporation was engaged in business of mining coal
within the State of Montana where its plants and mines
were located. The question before the court, upon demurrer,
was whether, under the following facts, the corporation ·was
also doing business in the state of its domicile within the
sense of the Montana statute:
"That a majority of the directors and officers
of the plaintiff corporation at all of the times herein
mentioned were, and now are, residing in the state
of Minnesota ; that all of the meetings of the stockholders, and of the board of directors, of the plaintiff corporation, have been held in the state of Minnesota; that at all of the times herein mentioned,
and now, the plaintiff corporation uses an office
in the city of St. Paul, Minn., equipped with desks
and furniture, all of which is owned by the Great
Northern Railway Company; that at all of the times
herein mentioned some of the business plans and
policies of the plaintiff corporation have been formulated at its principal office in St. Paul, Minn., and
that the business of the plaintiff corporation carried
on by it in the state of Montana is, and at all times
herein mentioned has been, partially supervised ~nd
directed through its main office in St. Paul, Minn.;
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that some of the financial affairs of the plaintiff
corporation at all of the times herein mentioned
were handled and managed by the plaintiff corpora.
tion at its head office in St. Paul, Minn., and some
of the proceeds derived from the business of the
plaintiff corporation in the state of Montana during the times herein mentioned were sent to the main
office of the plaintiff company at St. Paul, Minn.,
and deposited in certain banks in St. Paul, Minn., to
the credit of the plaintiff company, from which disbursements were made from time to time for the
expenses in operating its business in the state of
Montana; that during the year 1920 plaintiff received in the city of St. Paul, Minn., interest on
Liberty bonds and bank balances owned by it in
banks in the city of St. Paul, Minn., amounting to
$2,596.06, no part of which was returned by the
plaintiff as income of the plaintiff in computing
the license tax in question, and that the defendant
above named, by reason of the foregoing facts, adjudged that plaintiff was a corporation doing business partly outside of the state of Montana, and
that it was therefore not entitled to the deductions
specified in section 3 (2 ?) of said act."
The Supreme Court of Montana held that the activities
of the taxpaying corporation in Minnesota, hereinabove set
forth, did not constitute engaging in business within the
sense of the Montana Statute. The court said:
"From this it appears that, when the statute
uses the expression 'engaged in business,' whether
in this state or elsewhere, it is speaking in terms of
profit and loss, and does not refer to mere corporate
action, such as holding meetings of the board of
directors, doing clerical work of bookkeeping, formulating the plans and policies, or performing other
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corporate acts, which do not in and of themselves
result in the production of income, but does contemplate some kind of business the conduct of which
results in an income-some gainful occupation of the
corporation. This purpose and intent is manifest
all through the various provisions of the statute."
"Necessarily a corporation must do certain acts
with reference to its corporate activity at the state
in which it is incorporated. Usually it must maintain an office, keep certain records, and hold annual
meetings of its stockholders therein. Doing these
things implies that it is carrying on business to
some extent in such state, but by doing them it is
not 'engaged in business' there, within the purview
of the statute, which uses the word 'business' solely
in connection with its gainful pursuit, and as a
means of determining its net income as the basis of
fixing a license fee. In the statute under consideration the activity of the corporation is not made the
measure of the license fee, except as such activity
manifests itself in the production of income."
The foregoing decision of the Supreme Court of Montana is cited and approved by said court in State v. J. C.
Maguire Const. Co., 113 Mont. 324, 125 P. 2d 433, which
holds that the Montana Statute, construed in the Junod
case, imposes a franchise tax upon the privilege of doing
business in Montana in a corporate capacity.
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CONCLUSION
The record, which is before this court for review, discloses that the defendant's decision denying plaintiff's
claims for refund is contrary to law because the taxes for
which plaintiff claims a refund, were paid by plaintiff on
income which was all derived from business done by plaintiff in the State of Colorado. Said record also discloses~
that defendant's decision, denying plaintiff's claims for re- ·
fund for taxes paid by plaintiff for the taxable years 1949
and 1950, is contrary to law because plaintiff was not
doing business in Utah during said taxable years within
the purview of Title 59, Chapter 13, Utah Code Annotated
1953. Plaintiff prays this Honorable Court, therefore, that
plaintiff's claims for refund be allowed, with interest.
April 17, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
C. E. HENDERSON, of
RAY, RAWLINS,
JONES & HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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